![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
~
Summary: Most people think overpopulation is one of the worst dangers facing the globe. In fact, the opposite is true. As countries get richer, their populations age and their birthrates plummet. And this is not just a problem of rich countries: the developing world is also getting older fast. Falling birthrates might seem beneficial, but the economic and social price is too steep to pay. The right policies could help turn the tide, but only if enacted before it's too late.
-- "The Global Baby Bust" by Phillip Longman for Foreign Affairs (May/June 2004)
First, Monk had been toying with the idea of putting some more beef into his reading and going beyond his national papers, notwithstanding books. With his Christmas Day column, David Brooks made it easier with his column on essays. Since Foreign Affairs and The Wilson Quarterly seem largely free, we may try to run with this idea.
Of course, this is even worse than columns and newspaper articles, as far as blogging goes. This is for Monk's own record first and foremost, but we may leave a number of posts available for the possibility that this or that piece might be of interest to some.
Mr. Longman's article has succeeded in moving Monk away from the idea that, in spite of lower birth rates in the developed nations, the planet was still heading for a catastrophic population explosion. One remembers some years ago, watching the conservative Ben Wattenberg on Koppel's Nightline arguing that we were really threatened by a global baby bust, and thinking he was nuts. No longer.
Although the discussion is drier, Mr. Longman raises interesting implications of a global baby bust, over and above the economic and fiscal strains for societies and governments, such as possibly lessening radicalism in the Middle East as well as hamstringing America's military ambitions, and the interesting tension between sectarianism and secularism as they play out on this demographic phenomenon.
___ ___ ___
...Still, both day-to-day experience and the media frequently suggest that the quality of life enjoyed in the United States and Europe is under threat by population growth. Sprawling suburban development is making traffic worse, driving taxes up, and reducing opportunities to enjoy nature. Televised images of developing-world famine, war, and environmental degradation prompt some to wonder, "Why do these people have so many kids?" Immigrants and other people's children wind up competing for jobs, access to health care, parking spaces, favorite fishing holes, hiking paths, and spots at the beach. No wonder that, when asked how long it will take for world population to double, nearly half of all Americans say 20 years or less.
Yet a closer look at demographic trends shows that the rate of world population growth has fallen by more than 40 percent since the late 1960s. And forecasts by the UN and other organizations show that, even in the absence of major wars or pandemics, the number of human beings on the planet could well start to decline within the lifetime of today's children. Demographers at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis predict that human population will peak (at 9 billion) by 2070 and then start to contract. Long before then, many nations will shrink in absolute size, and the average age of the world's citizens will shoot up dramatically. Moreover, the populations that will age fastest are in the Middle East and other underdeveloped regions. During the remainder of this century, even sub-Saharan Africa will likely grow older than Europe is today.
...Now the developing world, as it becomes more urban and industrialized, is experiencing the same demographic transition, but at a faster pace. Today, when Americans think of Mexico, for example, they think of televised images of desperate, unemployed youths swimming the Rio Grande or slipping through border fences. Yet because Mexican fertility rates have dropped so dramatically, the country is now aging five times faster than is the United States. It took 50 years for the American median age to rise just five years, from 30 to 35. By contrast, between 2000 and 2050, Mexico's median age, according to UN projections, will increase by 20 years, leaving half the population over 42. Meanwhile, the median American age in 2050 is expected to be 39.7.
Those televised images of desperate, unemployed youth broadcast from the Middle East create a similarly misleading impression. Fertility rates are falling faster in the Middle East than anywhere else on earth, and as a result, the region's population is aging at an unprecedented rate. For example, by mid-century, Algeria will see its median age increase from 21.7 to 40, according to UN projections. Postrevolutionary Iran has seen its fertility rate plummet by nearly two-thirds and will accordingly have more seniors than children by 2030.
Countries such as France and Japan at least got a chance to grow rich before they grew old. Today, most developing countries are growing old before they get rich. China's low fertility means that its labor force will start shrinking by 2020, and 30 percent of China's population could be over 60 by mid-century. More worrisome, China's social security system, which covers only a fraction of the population, already has debts exceeding 145 percent of its GDP. Making demographics there even worse, the spreading use of ultrasound and other techniques for determining the sex of fetuses is, as in India and many other parts of the world, leading to much higher abortion rates for females than for males. In China, the ratio of male to female births is now 117 to 100 -- which implies that roughly one out of six males in today's new generation will not succeed in reproducing.
All told, some 59 countries, comprising roughly 44 percent of the world's total population, are currently not producing enough children to avoid population decline, and the phenomenon continues to spread. By 2045, according to the latest UN projections, the world's fertility rate as a whole will have fallen below replacement levels.
...Over the next decade, the Middle East could benefit from a similar "demographic dividend." Birthrates fell in every single Middle Eastern country during the 1990s, often dramatically. The resulting "middle aging" of the region will lower the overall dependency ratio over the next 10 to 20 years, freeing up more resources for infrastructure and industrial development. The appeal of radicalism could also diminish as young adults make up less of the population and Middle Eastern societies become increasingly dominated by middle-aged people concerned with such practical issues as health care and retirement savings. Just as population aging in the West during the 1980s was accompanied by the disappearance of youthful indigenous terrorist groups such as the Red Brigades and the Weather Underground, falling birthrates in the Middle East could well produce societies far less prone to political violence.
Declining fertility rates at first bring a "demographic dividend." That dividend has to be repaid, however, if the trend continues. Although at first the fact that there are fewer children to feed, clothe, and educate leaves more for adults to enjoy, soon enough, if fertility falls beneath replacement levels, the number of productive workers drops as well, and the number of dependent elderly increase. And these older citizens consume far more resources than children do. Even after considering the cost of education, a typical child in the United States consumes 28 percent less than the typical working-age adult, whereas elders consume 27 percent more, mostly in health-related expenses.
...Current population trends are likely to have another major impact: they will make military actions increasingly difficult for most nations. One reason for this change will be psychological. In countries where parents generally have only one or two children, every soldier becomes a "Private Ryan" -- a soldier whose loss would mean overwhelming devastation to his or her family. In the later years of the Soviet Union, for example, collapsing birthrates in the Russian core meant that by 1990, the number of Russians aged 15-24 had shrunk by 5.2 million from 25 years before. Given their few sons, it is hardly surprising that Russian mothers for the first time in the nation's history organized an antiwar movement, and that Soviet society decided that its casualties in Afghanistan were unacceptable.
...Today there is a strong correlation between religious conviction and high fertility. In the United States, for example, fully 47 percent of people who attend church weekly say that the ideal family size is three or more children, as compared to only 27 percent of those who seldom attend church. In Utah, where 69 percent of all residents are registered members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, fertility rates are the highest in the nation. Utah annually produces 90 children for every 1,000 women of childbearing age. By comparison, Vermont -- the only state to send a socialist to Congress and the first to embrace gay civil unions -- produces only 49.
Does this mean that the future belongs to those who believe they are (or who are in fact) commanded by a higher power to procreate? Based on current trends, the answer appears to be yes. Once, demographers believed that some law of human nature would prevent fertility rates from remaining below replacement level within any healthy population for more than brief periods. After all, don't we all carry the genes of our Neolithic ancestors, who one way or another managed to produce enough babies to sustain the race? Today, however, it has become clear that no law of nature ensures that human beings, living in free, developed societies, will create enough children to reproduce themselves. Japanese fertility rates have been below replacement levels since the mid-1950s, and the last time Europeans produced enough children to reproduce themselves was the mid-1970s. Yet modern institutions have yet to adapt to this new reality.
Current demographic trends work against modernity in another way as well. Not only is the spread of urbanization and industrialization itself a major cause of falling fertility, it is also a major cause of so-called diseases of affluence, such as overeating, lack of exercise, and substance abuse, which leave a higher and higher percentage of the population stricken by chronic medical conditions. Those who reject modernity would thus seem to have an evolutionary advantage, whether they are clean-living Mormons or Muslims, or members of emerging sects and national movements that emphasize high birthrates and anti-materialism.
SECULAR SOLUTIONS
How can secular societies avoid population loss and decline? The problem is not that most people in these societies have lost interest in children. Among childless Americans aged 41 years and older in 2003, for example, 76 percent say they wish they had had children, up from 70 percent in 1990. In 2000, 40-year-old women in the United States and in every European nation told surveys that they had produced fewer children than they intended. Indeed, if European women now in their 40s had been able to produce their ideal number of children, the continent would face no prospect of population loss.
The problem, then, is not one of desire. The problem is that even as modern societies demand more and more investment in human capital, this demand threatens its own supply. The clear tendency of economic development is toward a more knowledge-based, networked economy in which decision-making and responsibility are increasingly necessary at lower levels. In such economies, however, children often remain economically dependent on their parents well into their own childbearing years because it takes that long to acquire the panoply of technical skills, credentials, social understanding, and personal maturity that more and more jobs now require. For the same reason, many couples discover that by the time they feel they can afford children, they can no longer produce them, or must settle for just one or two.
...In his 1968 bestseller "The Population Bomb," Paul Ehrlich warned, "The battle to feed all of humanity is over. In the 1970s the world will undergo famines -- hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked upon now." Fortunately, Ehrlich's prediction proved wrong. But having averted the danger of overpopulation, the world now faces the opposite problem: an aging and declining population. We are, in one sense, lucky to have this problem and not its opposite. But that doesn't make the problem any less serious, or the solutions any less necessary.
-- Phillip Longman
.
Summary: Most people think overpopulation is one of the worst dangers facing the globe. In fact, the opposite is true. As countries get richer, their populations age and their birthrates plummet. And this is not just a problem of rich countries: the developing world is also getting older fast. Falling birthrates might seem beneficial, but the economic and social price is too steep to pay. The right policies could help turn the tide, but only if enacted before it's too late.
-- "The Global Baby Bust" by Phillip Longman for Foreign Affairs (May/June 2004)
First, Monk had been toying with the idea of putting some more beef into his reading and going beyond his national papers, notwithstanding books. With his Christmas Day column, David Brooks made it easier with his column on essays. Since Foreign Affairs and The Wilson Quarterly seem largely free, we may try to run with this idea.
Of course, this is even worse than columns and newspaper articles, as far as blogging goes. This is for Monk's own record first and foremost, but we may leave a number of posts available for the possibility that this or that piece might be of interest to some.
Mr. Longman's article has succeeded in moving Monk away from the idea that, in spite of lower birth rates in the developed nations, the planet was still heading for a catastrophic population explosion. One remembers some years ago, watching the conservative Ben Wattenberg on Koppel's Nightline arguing that we were really threatened by a global baby bust, and thinking he was nuts. No longer.
Although the discussion is drier, Mr. Longman raises interesting implications of a global baby bust, over and above the economic and fiscal strains for societies and governments, such as possibly lessening radicalism in the Middle East as well as hamstringing America's military ambitions, and the interesting tension between sectarianism and secularism as they play out on this demographic phenomenon.
___ ___ ___
...Still, both day-to-day experience and the media frequently suggest that the quality of life enjoyed in the United States and Europe is under threat by population growth. Sprawling suburban development is making traffic worse, driving taxes up, and reducing opportunities to enjoy nature. Televised images of developing-world famine, war, and environmental degradation prompt some to wonder, "Why do these people have so many kids?" Immigrants and other people's children wind up competing for jobs, access to health care, parking spaces, favorite fishing holes, hiking paths, and spots at the beach. No wonder that, when asked how long it will take for world population to double, nearly half of all Americans say 20 years or less.
Yet a closer look at demographic trends shows that the rate of world population growth has fallen by more than 40 percent since the late 1960s. And forecasts by the UN and other organizations show that, even in the absence of major wars or pandemics, the number of human beings on the planet could well start to decline within the lifetime of today's children. Demographers at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis predict that human population will peak (at 9 billion) by 2070 and then start to contract. Long before then, many nations will shrink in absolute size, and the average age of the world's citizens will shoot up dramatically. Moreover, the populations that will age fastest are in the Middle East and other underdeveloped regions. During the remainder of this century, even sub-Saharan Africa will likely grow older than Europe is today.
...Now the developing world, as it becomes more urban and industrialized, is experiencing the same demographic transition, but at a faster pace. Today, when Americans think of Mexico, for example, they think of televised images of desperate, unemployed youths swimming the Rio Grande or slipping through border fences. Yet because Mexican fertility rates have dropped so dramatically, the country is now aging five times faster than is the United States. It took 50 years for the American median age to rise just five years, from 30 to 35. By contrast, between 2000 and 2050, Mexico's median age, according to UN projections, will increase by 20 years, leaving half the population over 42. Meanwhile, the median American age in 2050 is expected to be 39.7.
Those televised images of desperate, unemployed youth broadcast from the Middle East create a similarly misleading impression. Fertility rates are falling faster in the Middle East than anywhere else on earth, and as a result, the region's population is aging at an unprecedented rate. For example, by mid-century, Algeria will see its median age increase from 21.7 to 40, according to UN projections. Postrevolutionary Iran has seen its fertility rate plummet by nearly two-thirds and will accordingly have more seniors than children by 2030.
Countries such as France and Japan at least got a chance to grow rich before they grew old. Today, most developing countries are growing old before they get rich. China's low fertility means that its labor force will start shrinking by 2020, and 30 percent of China's population could be over 60 by mid-century. More worrisome, China's social security system, which covers only a fraction of the population, already has debts exceeding 145 percent of its GDP. Making demographics there even worse, the spreading use of ultrasound and other techniques for determining the sex of fetuses is, as in India and many other parts of the world, leading to much higher abortion rates for females than for males. In China, the ratio of male to female births is now 117 to 100 -- which implies that roughly one out of six males in today's new generation will not succeed in reproducing.
All told, some 59 countries, comprising roughly 44 percent of the world's total population, are currently not producing enough children to avoid population decline, and the phenomenon continues to spread. By 2045, according to the latest UN projections, the world's fertility rate as a whole will have fallen below replacement levels.
...Over the next decade, the Middle East could benefit from a similar "demographic dividend." Birthrates fell in every single Middle Eastern country during the 1990s, often dramatically. The resulting "middle aging" of the region will lower the overall dependency ratio over the next 10 to 20 years, freeing up more resources for infrastructure and industrial development. The appeal of radicalism could also diminish as young adults make up less of the population and Middle Eastern societies become increasingly dominated by middle-aged people concerned with such practical issues as health care and retirement savings. Just as population aging in the West during the 1980s was accompanied by the disappearance of youthful indigenous terrorist groups such as the Red Brigades and the Weather Underground, falling birthrates in the Middle East could well produce societies far less prone to political violence.
Declining fertility rates at first bring a "demographic dividend." That dividend has to be repaid, however, if the trend continues. Although at first the fact that there are fewer children to feed, clothe, and educate leaves more for adults to enjoy, soon enough, if fertility falls beneath replacement levels, the number of productive workers drops as well, and the number of dependent elderly increase. And these older citizens consume far more resources than children do. Even after considering the cost of education, a typical child in the United States consumes 28 percent less than the typical working-age adult, whereas elders consume 27 percent more, mostly in health-related expenses.
...Current population trends are likely to have another major impact: they will make military actions increasingly difficult for most nations. One reason for this change will be psychological. In countries where parents generally have only one or two children, every soldier becomes a "Private Ryan" -- a soldier whose loss would mean overwhelming devastation to his or her family. In the later years of the Soviet Union, for example, collapsing birthrates in the Russian core meant that by 1990, the number of Russians aged 15-24 had shrunk by 5.2 million from 25 years before. Given their few sons, it is hardly surprising that Russian mothers for the first time in the nation's history organized an antiwar movement, and that Soviet society decided that its casualties in Afghanistan were unacceptable.
...Today there is a strong correlation between religious conviction and high fertility. In the United States, for example, fully 47 percent of people who attend church weekly say that the ideal family size is three or more children, as compared to only 27 percent of those who seldom attend church. In Utah, where 69 percent of all residents are registered members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, fertility rates are the highest in the nation. Utah annually produces 90 children for every 1,000 women of childbearing age. By comparison, Vermont -- the only state to send a socialist to Congress and the first to embrace gay civil unions -- produces only 49.
Does this mean that the future belongs to those who believe they are (or who are in fact) commanded by a higher power to procreate? Based on current trends, the answer appears to be yes. Once, demographers believed that some law of human nature would prevent fertility rates from remaining below replacement level within any healthy population for more than brief periods. After all, don't we all carry the genes of our Neolithic ancestors, who one way or another managed to produce enough babies to sustain the race? Today, however, it has become clear that no law of nature ensures that human beings, living in free, developed societies, will create enough children to reproduce themselves. Japanese fertility rates have been below replacement levels since the mid-1950s, and the last time Europeans produced enough children to reproduce themselves was the mid-1970s. Yet modern institutions have yet to adapt to this new reality.
Current demographic trends work against modernity in another way as well. Not only is the spread of urbanization and industrialization itself a major cause of falling fertility, it is also a major cause of so-called diseases of affluence, such as overeating, lack of exercise, and substance abuse, which leave a higher and higher percentage of the population stricken by chronic medical conditions. Those who reject modernity would thus seem to have an evolutionary advantage, whether they are clean-living Mormons or Muslims, or members of emerging sects and national movements that emphasize high birthrates and anti-materialism.
SECULAR SOLUTIONS
How can secular societies avoid population loss and decline? The problem is not that most people in these societies have lost interest in children. Among childless Americans aged 41 years and older in 2003, for example, 76 percent say they wish they had had children, up from 70 percent in 1990. In 2000, 40-year-old women in the United States and in every European nation told surveys that they had produced fewer children than they intended. Indeed, if European women now in their 40s had been able to produce their ideal number of children, the continent would face no prospect of population loss.
The problem, then, is not one of desire. The problem is that even as modern societies demand more and more investment in human capital, this demand threatens its own supply. The clear tendency of economic development is toward a more knowledge-based, networked economy in which decision-making and responsibility are increasingly necessary at lower levels. In such economies, however, children often remain economically dependent on their parents well into their own childbearing years because it takes that long to acquire the panoply of technical skills, credentials, social understanding, and personal maturity that more and more jobs now require. For the same reason, many couples discover that by the time they feel they can afford children, they can no longer produce them, or must settle for just one or two.
...In his 1968 bestseller "The Population Bomb," Paul Ehrlich warned, "The battle to feed all of humanity is over. In the 1970s the world will undergo famines -- hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked upon now." Fortunately, Ehrlich's prediction proved wrong. But having averted the danger of overpopulation, the world now faces the opposite problem: an aging and declining population. We are, in one sense, lucky to have this problem and not its opposite. But that doesn't make the problem any less serious, or the solutions any less necessary.
-- Phillip Longman
.
![[identity profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/openid.png){kind=small}
no subject
Date: 2004-12-27 05:55 pm (UTC)From:Am I alone in thinking that reasoning is a little odd? For one thing, the circumstances are entirely different.
Also, this argument surprises me a little... the last information I heard was that the aging trend was common in the industrialised world, but other regions such as South America are experiencing the opposite.
no subject
Date: 2004-12-27 07:25 pm (UTC)From:That sounds like a very fair objection, as the researcher may be drawing overbroad associations and jumping to grand conclusions. I think I took it in because I saw the argument as just a broader version of crime rates in general - more youths meaning more crime. I certainly wouldn't look to this demographic phenomenon for the answer to our Middle East problems. I thought it was an interesting conclusion, and one is happy for any encouraging signs, heh.
I originally thought as you did, regarding the differences between the developed and the developing nations. When I heard Wattenberg speaking on the subject, he said that the birth rates were going down to something like 5 children per family, which led me to think that's hardly a baby bust.
Still, I could be too fast in following this guy's tune, but considering that urbanization has been proceeding apace in the developing world as well, if this is true, I'm now inclined to be persuaded. Personally, I suppose I should still keep my mind open, I guess.
no subject
Date: 2004-12-27 08:32 pm (UTC)From:Now, I don't know where the figures actually stand, but if we aren't hitting 10 billion in the next twenty years, then it sounds to me that there is some come down from previous expectations of doom through population explosion.
Now in so far as we are hardly talking about a Baby Dearth, we perhaps should note that Longmans's argument isn't that it's a bad thing that population figures should be coming down, but that there are serious costs involved with the implications of that - more needy elderly people and fewer young workers and entrepreneurers. In America, with so much focus on Social Security and Medicare, this hardly even seems newsworthy, except that we are also talking about a growing global phenomenon.
no subject
Date: 2004-12-29 11:11 am (UTC)From:A very interesting (and to me somewhat troubling) phenomenon will come in 20 years when the elderly come to dominate the political process. Of course the elderly always vote in high numbers, but when our population has such a high percentage of the aged I'm afraid that political agendas might be altered drastically. This isn't to say that the elderly don't deserve better, but I'm worried about the rest of us.
no subject
Date: 2004-12-28 09:46 am (UTC)From:I'm wondering how much of it has to do with women's rights. When women figure out that they are more than just babymaking machines and can assert themselves in the world, the birthrate drops.
I know my girlfriend and myself would love to have a couple of kids, but not until we've been married for awhile. And we sure could use some assistance with a wedding and then funding for the kids, a house, whatnot.
Given the fact that we can't feed our current world population, it does make a little sense though. We're overpopulated currently, but will suffer the consequences of that later. Or perhaps this is just the cycle of ups and downs over the course of time.
I think much of the "overpopulation" comes from quality of life issues. The desire for fewer people but who all have better lives. No use repopulating the world if it is essentially for hard laborers, etc.. A bit unfair.
Hopefully we can find that happy medium.
no subject
Date: 2004-12-28 08:47 pm (UTC)From:In the West, I think it may be more than a matter of women having the freedom to assert themselves as more than mothers. Economic and competitive pressures are also in play that make getting a job or profession more necessary - even if to get that higher standard of living of that suburban life. Just to raise their two kids, if they have them, entails more pressure, wanting to do right by them, considering the cost of educating them and preparing them to compete in our society.
I'm inclined to agree that sticking to replacement rates is probably good, and that it isn't bad to go under for a while, given the high population levels that already exist. The main issue involves what our country is dealing with now over Social Security policy - how to handle the demographic bomb that is coming with an aged population and not enough young workers to support them at the levels we've been accustomed to. It's just going to be a heavy cost to government, which will crowd out a lot of the things we want our government to do, such as better education and other public services.
no subject
Date: 2004-12-28 11:30 am (UTC)From:But low birthrates, mean an aging population, and no one to pay for the pensions. The productive workforce becomes a smaller proportion of the population, and they have to pay higher taxes to pay for previous generations pensions. The solution, a higher birthrate, at first means the working population has to bear increased costs for both their parents and their children's generations, a gruesome prospect - only in the subsequent generation can things even out.
In Italy and Spain the average family has 1 child. Not having two means population decline. The result is going to be countries that cannot support their old without massive immigration from poorer countries who were keener to have children.
Over here the religious factor isn't relevant. Here the main thing is ethnic - white Anglo Saxons have reduced family sizes, but West Indian and Asian families have mostly not done so. This is Britain's main hope of avoiding the effects - our immigrants. Maybe the influence in their case is religious, I'm not sure. Italy and Spain are in for terrible problems, and I don't think they have any way out. I suspect it is just too late.
Reasons? Economic illiteracy amongst politicians, resulting lack of foresight, and a society in which a couple who have no children and both work have enormous advantages economically over a couple who have children and one of whom takes care of them (or they have to pay someone else). In the short term interest of the individual, childlessness is very worthwhile. But in the next generation, there will be no one to make the goods that their pensions ought to be able to buy. They will be worthless.
Solutions - nothing other than massive measures to alter the tax burden on those who do or do not have children. It is so expensive to society as a whole for individuals to opt out of having children that there is no way round paying other people to have them. Now that may infringe on peoples choice of lifestyle, looking at it one way. But look at it the other - we have already infringed on peoples preferred lifestyles, because they are already having fewer children than they want to (according to the article). And what infringes on our lifestyle more than creating a society in which we ensure poverty in old age?
All of this follows from our having made children optional. Now we are going to have to say, they will remain optional, but see that family round the corner who dote on their kids, and have lots of them, as saving the nation, and reward them with handouts to support the kids, so tomorrow those kids will pay for everyone's pensions.
Short of making children compulsory, or denying certain priviliges to people by law unless they have children, I cannot see any alternative to tax measures, and very radical ones at that.
What people don't usually realise is that it is the couple with no children by choice who have driven the housing market insane. Start with a society in which all families average two children. Now introduce a proportion who have none by choice. They will be far more able to afford housing. This drives the price of housing up. Soon, to afford housing, one has to trim the idea of having a family - fewer children, or later, and smaller bedrooms for all, just to be able to afford a house. And the more that happens, the more the effect increases, until today over here I cannot see how any couple in average jobs can afford a house without choosing to forego children - at least until it is really, really late.
And this in turn relates to the amount of time children live with their parents - if it is extortionately expensive to leave home (for rents are related to the purchase price of housing) the age at which they can afford to do so increases.
We have made our societies non-viable by having fewer children than they need, and now the measures required are urgent and radical.
no subject
Date: 2004-12-28 09:10 pm (UTC)From:The issue is then how do we care and pay for an aged-heavy population that would have to exist for a term before the demographics balance out again. It can seem like there's just no way to avoid the pain of having to see geriatric care taking up a lot more of the resources that we might like to see going elsewhere.
There are smarter ways and dumber ways of trying to tackle that problem. It would seem reasonable to be doubtful, for instance, how Bush wants to manage that problem for Americans, with his privatization policies for Social Security, given the man's record - which promises to make things worse while only improving the fortunes of his fellow plutocrats, lol.
no subject
Date: 2004-12-28 09:35 pm (UTC)From:I have no reason to be confident in the Republicans in respect of solving the problem, and I can't begin to analyse your system as I am not familiar with it.
Nothing will replace finding effective measures for causing people to have more children, pronto, and nothing will make this easy on taxation - other than to keep the total tax take neutral, and take less from those with children and more from those without.
In a two party system with an electorate with no real sophistication in terms of economic theory, more than likely both political elites will shy away from the need to tackle the problem, hope the other does so, and then blame them for the cost.
You are almost certainly a lot better off in this respect than the EU. And no matter what else happens, I think in fifty years this era will be remembered as the one that was so dumb that it failed to have children to secure its own future. After that the mistake will not easily be made again.
The tragedy is that nothing I have quoted above is outside the compass of my 'A' level in Economics, taken at age 17. At that time the lecturer who taught me told us all that on passing the course we would know more about the subject than 80 to 85% upwards of our elected representatives at national level. At that time I was very doubtful of his claim. By the time I passed that course, I knew he was right.
So the entire thing was completely predictable, but no one has had the foresight to prevent the problem or the guts to sell a solution to the uneducated.
Just expect Spain, Italy, and some other European areas to economically implode, or accept high levels of migration, or both, or find a way of screwing the rest of the EU for their own stupid policies, bringing them all down as well. 20 years to meltdown, I'd say.